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Introduction
Delay is an important aspect of many situations in which a public good is to be provided through private contributions. This was first pointed out as an empirical observation by Olson (1982, p. 39-40 ) with respect to delayed formation of organized interest groups. Other salient examples include delayed adoption of standards by societies or certain industries (see Farrell and Saloner, 1988) , and the pivotal role played by delay in the political economy of policy reform as considered by Drazen (2000) .
Typically, authors have explained delay in private provision games by introducing private information. In Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) a public good is to be provided completely by one individual. Individuals who have private information about their costs, play a waiting game to see if someone will come forward to provide the good. Gradstein (1993) retains the assumption of private information about contribution costs but considers a production technology where the public good is produced by the number of contributing individuals with decreasing returns. Both find there is inefficient delay if the number of individuals is finite. Similarly, in applied contributions such as Alesina and Drazen (1991) , delay is driven by some waiting game which originates in private information.
However, there seem to be many situations with inefficient delay in which full information seems to be a valid approximation. Therefore it is worthwhile studying alternative causes of delay. In this paper I concentrate on the role of The convexity of costs usually implies the optimality of project completion in some positive time. However, in such a setting, individual contributions may be postponed for two reasons. First, convexity of costs implies an incentive to spread out contributions in order to decrease marginal costs.
If individual costs and benefits are not perfectly aligned with their social counterparts, this creates a social inefficiency. Second, the dynamic nature of the situation adds a time dimension to the players' incentives to free ride on others' contributions. The paper analyzes how individual heterogeneity, order of moves and the absence of commitment devices will affect delay in such a setting.
The findings of the model are as follows. In a perfectly symmetric setting with commitment, a continuum (with respect to completion time) of symmetric completing equilibria exists which contains the social optimum as the 2 lower bound completion time. This Pareto-dominates all other symmetric equilibria, so that it is the natural outcome. If commitment is retained but players are asymmetric or players do not commit to their contribution paths simultaneously, inefficient delay occurs for distributional reasons. Finally, in a symmetric setting without commitment, inefficient delay occurs in equilibrium. No player can contribute efficiently fast, since this will leave him open to exploitation by the other players later on. Furthermore, unlike the private provision of a continuously divisible public good, individual contributions are strategic complements, which make partial harmonization of strategies seem beneficial and this is important in many policy-related applications. The results are in line with the observation that, in many real life examples, delay seems to be closely related to asymmetric players and missing compensation mechanisms as well as to the lack of commitment devices.
The paper relates to two further strands of literature. First, there is the connection with the the private provision games of a continuously divisible public good in dynamic settings analyzed by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Wirl (1996) and Itaya and Shimomura (2001) . This literature finds that without commitment the provision level may be either higher or lower, depending on the set of admissible strategies.
Second, and more importantly, Admati and Perry (1991) 
Alternatively, a project whose size is proportional to the number of users can be considered. In this case (5) is replaced by k(T ) = nK, and parameters have to be assumed that, even for n = 1, make it beneficial to carry out the project. The solution of SWP is summarized in the following
Proposition 1 The socially optimal contribution paths to the project are
given as x * (t) = 
Proof: See appendix.
Naturally, with positive discounting, the optimal policy is to increase contributions exponentially at rate r until completion, in order to keep the present value of the marginal cost of an additional unit of contribution unchanged. Only projects for which D > Nash Equilibrium is given by a vector of n optimal time paths, such that
s.t.
x i ≥ 0, (4) and (5), where the other contributions are taken as given in (7).
The symmetric equilibria are summarized in optimal for player two to contribute her half up to that time as well, since speeding up not only has higher marginal costs for the own given share of one half, but also necessitates taking over some of player 1's share. However, if player one chooses to stretch her share's contribution beyondT , then it 7 pays for player two to take over some of player one's share. Consequently, no T >T can be an equilibrium. In the appendix it is shown that the cut-off point is indeed given byT . The logic extends straightforwardly to the n-player case. The non-completing equilibrium follows directly from the assumption that carrying out the entire project individually is not profitable.
If all players expect the others not to contribute, their best responses are also not to contribute and the project will not be undertaken.
The efficient equilibrium Pareto-dominates the non-completing and the other symmetric completing equilibria, so that, with pre-play communication, reaching the first best seems a plausible outcome. Thus, with perfectly symmetric players and commitment no inefficiencies from delay are likely to occur. Apparently, there are two decisive features that trigger the result. 
First mover and asymmetry
Let me now consider the robustness of the optimality results under commitment. I will discuss two modifications to the above setting, where, for simplicity, I focus on the two-player setting, though the considerations extend directly to the n-player case.
First, suppose that the game is changed to a Stackelberg setting in the sense that player 1 gets to choose her contribution path first before player 2 chooses hers. As in the static private provision game of a discrete public good, the Stackelberg leader is in a position to extract some rent from the follower. In a static setting all rent is extracted from the follower. 1 Here, however, the leader will leave some rent for the follower. The reason is that the follower has another instrument to react to the leader's attempt to shift a bigger share of the project's size to the follower. This instrument is to delay contributions in order to smooth marginal costs. This will hurt the leader, since completion is delayed. Thus the leader faces a trade-off between shifting a larger share of the project's size to the follower and the induced completion delay. While, for the given model, the situation can no longer be solved out in closed form, it can be shown that the leader's profits are increasing in the follower's share if her own share is one half. Thus, the leader will always shift some burden, and this will delay completion. Obviously, this argument only holds, if the project creates positive profits that can be shifted.
Similarly, if players are asymmetric, either with respect to their cost pa- rameter c i or to their benefits D i , even with commitment the project will not be completed in the socially optimal time unless side payments are possible.
The reason is that, in such a situation, the individual problem is no longer a scaled down version of the social problem. People whose marginal cost is lower will not contribute enough. Similarly, players with lower benefits will not contribute fast enough.
Again, it is interesting to consider the static counterpart. If players are sufficiently asymmetric in the productivity of their contributions, the discrete public good may not be provided, even though it would be socially desirable.
This may also happen in the dynamic situation, but, typically, there is a number of projects for which the inefficiencies arise from delayed completion.
Thus, both the possibility of committing first to a contribution path and asymmetry among the players will typically cause the optimality result under commitment to break down. The players' interests are no longer perfectly aligned or, in the Stackelberg setting, are even partly opposed. Thus, distributional reasons prevent the parties from achieving the first best solution.
In the Stackelberg case, the outright aim is to exploit the other party, in the asymmetry case, it is the inability of the less productive, or the party who profits more to compensate the other through redistribution. In fact, such asymmetries are present in many real life examples, and in many situations they constitute an important reason for excessive delay.
The Markov perfect equilibrium
Let me now turn to the situation where no commitment at the beginning of the game is possible. For this, I consider the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of the game as set up in section 3. The strategies of the players, φ(k, t), are now allowed to depend on time and the evolution of the state variable k, the progress of the project. Thus, they are rules conditioned on these variables. This implies that, at any instance, players reoptimize their contributions based on the sum of all contributions made up to that time, so that these strategies are time consistent. An MPE is given by a vector of n optimal rules, such that
In fact, since the problem is independent of time, the strategies will only depend on the project's progress, φ(k). Again, there is a non-completing equilibrium in which no player ever contributes and a completing equilibrium, which is given in always profit from such harmonization, with strategic complementarity, the subgroup forming the coalition will typically also increase its welfare (Gaudet and Salant, 1991) . Here, the conjecture is that the harmonization of the own strategy with a partner weakens the time-consistency problem. Free-riding within the coalition is prevented through harmonization, free-riding outside the coalition is reduced due to strategic complementarity. Both effects lead to faster completion. Thus, partial harmonization leaves everybody better off.
Finally, this finding may be relevant for a class of design problems, in which some benevolent designer can choose wether the public good to be provided through private contributions should be discrete or continuous. Since this choice determines wether individual contributions are complements or substitutes, it may be beneficial to choose a discrete public good, if commitment devices for some subgroup of agents exist.
Conclusion
I have studied a situation in which a public project is provided through pri- to harmonize their strategies, they will profit from harmonizing and earlier and successful completion is more likely to result.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: The Hamiltonian of the SWP is given as
Consequently, the necessary conditions are then given by
.
The optimal individual contribution path follows directly from (9) . Solving the system of (9), (10) and (11) by making use of the initial and terminal conditions (4) and (5) delivers the resulting completion time given in proposition 1.
Proof of proposition 2:
For the proof it is helpful first to establish a lemma which establishes the fact that under commitment individual actions can be perfectly summarized by the individual's planned project share and the planned termination time. 
Proof:
The exponential contribution path follows directly from cost minimization. The present value of an additional marginal contribution should be kept constant. The relationship between δK, T and λ satisfies that the project share is actually reached in the planned time.
These general properties of the players' contibution paths can now be used to prove proposition 2. For simplicity, I normalize the project size to one and demonstrate, for the two player, case thatT is indeed the cut-off value above which it pays to take over some of the other players' share, but below which it does not. Suppose that player two chooses a project share of one half and some T 2 >T . In this case it is never a best response for player 1 to choose the same completion time but some completion time smaller than 
where the value of λ has to be derived from the increased overall burden by taking over part of player two's contribution. If player 1 expects player 2 to choose T 2 >T , then, by lemma 1, he also expects an exponential contribution path for player 2 fulfilling 
Then, the change in costs is given as This holds as an equality precisely at T 2 =T , so that it pays to take over some share, if T 2 >T , and to choose the same time,
The same reasoning can be applied in the general n-player case to deriveT as given in proposition 2.
